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NO. 29 APRIL 2021 Introduction 
Libya’s Flawed Unity Government 
A Semblance of Compromise Obscures Old and New Rifts 
Wolfram Lacher 
The formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) under Abdelhamid Dabeiba 
in March 2021 was a breakthrough in efforts to overcome Libya’s political division. 
But the settlement’s flaws are already starting to show. So far, political actors have 
merely agreed to compete for access to state funds within a unified government. Dis-
tributive struggles could soon test the government’s cohesion. Meanwhile, substan-
tive disagreements are being shoved aside; in particular, the government is trying to 
ignore the challenges in the security sector. Unless progress is made towards elections 
that are planned for December 2021, tensions between profiteers and opponents 
of the government risk provoking a new political crisis. But even the elections them-
selves harbour potential for renewed conflict. 
 
In February 2021, United Nations (UN) media-
tion efforts met with unexpected success 
when the UN-led Libyan Political Dialogue 
Forum (LPDF) selected a three-member 
Presidency Council and a prime minister. 
Even more surprising was Prime Minister 
Dabeiba’s success in winning his govern-
ment the endorsement of the House of Rep-
resentatives (HoR), which is the Libyan legis-
lative body that was elected in 2014. This 
endorsement has given Libya its first unified 
government since August 2014. According 
to the LPDF roadmap, the GNU’s term ends 
with elections that are planned for 24 De-
cember 2021 even though there is not yet 
any legal basis for their implementation. 
This breakthrough was unforeseen not 
only because the country’s political division 
had hardened in recent years, but also 
because the civil war over the capital of 
Tripoli from April 2019 to June 2020 
deepened societal rifts. The GNU’s forma-
tion also confounded expectations because 
the convergence between political repre-
sentatives in the LPDF was not matched by 
that between the actual parties to the con-
flict. The armed groups that fought each 
other in the most recent war remain affili-
ated with opposing military command struc-
tures and continue to host foreign forces 
and mercenaries to deter their adversaries. 
Another surprise was the role of Russia, 
Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
in consenting to the formation of the GNU, 
which they could plausibly have sought 
to prevent. After all, a unity government 
could seek to expel these states’ forces or 
mercenaries from Libya. But no such for-
eign obstruction occurred; in fact, Egypt 
and Turkey supported the process, even 
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though they had been on opposing sides 
in Libya for years. 
The negotiating framework emanated 
from the Berlin Process that Germany and 
the UN launched in autumn 2019 to broker 
an understanding between the foreign 
powers involved in Libya. But the Berlin 
Process was not the reason why the media-
tion efforts were able to gather momentum. 
Instead, two factors were key. First, in spring 
2020, Turkey’s military intervention in sup-
port of the Tripoli government – and in 
violation of the Berlin declaration of Janu-
ary 2020 – ended the war in Tripoli and 
created a balance of power. Khalifa Haftar, 
leader of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces 
(LAAF), could no longer hope for military 
victory. The ceasefire agreement signed 
under UN auspices in October 2020 merely 
formalized the prevailing stalemate. Sec-
ond, from January 2020 onwards, the war-
ring parties deprived each other of access 
to oil revenues, causing growing financial 
difficulties for both sides. Russian attempts 
to negotiate the resumption of oil produc-
tion in summer 2020 prompted the US to 
intensify its own mediation efforts on the 
matter. For Libya’s politicians, forming a 
unity government became the only way to 
once again unlock access to oil revenues. 
The Logic of Unification 
The UN-led process that produced the GNU 
was selective with regard to its participants 
and the questions it tackled. This facilitated 
the GNU’s formation, but also limited its 
prospects for success. 
The LPDF, which the UN first convened 
in November 2020, is one of the UN’s three 
negotiating forums intended to resolve 
conflict in Libya. The others are the Libyan 
Economic Dialogue and the Joint Military 
Commission, the latter of which yielded the 
October 2020 ceasefire agreement and has 
also been tasked with negotiating the uni-
fication of Libyan military command struc-
tures. 
Government formation through the 
LPDF, and subsequently the HoR, brought 
together politicians who mostly have only 
weak ties to forces on the ground. Half of 
the 75 representatives chosen by the UN to 
be LPDF participants are members of one of 
the two competing legislative bodies – the 
HoR and the High State Council. Over the 
past few years, these bodies have become 
infamous for defending their privileges and 
obstructing progress. In most cases, their con-
stituencies have long stopped seeing these 
parliamentarians as representing their in-
terests. Egypt, which exerts great influence 
over HoR Speaker Agila Saleh, ensured that 
the LPDF included numerous supporters of 
Saleh and that the HoR would need to ap-
prove LPDF decisions in order for them to 
become binding. In addition to the parlia-
mentarians, the LPDF includes proxies of 
individual political figures and, to a lesser 
extent, military actors, as well as civil 
society representatives. 
By contrast, Haftar’s forces and western 
Libyan armed groups are weakly represented 
in the LPDF, as are the concerns of the con-
flicts’ victims – internally displaced per-
sons, the war-disabled, and relatives of 
those killed in the conflicts. Indeed, LPDF 
delegates came to focus primarily on select-
ing members of the Presidency Council as 
well as the prime minister. 
Parliamentarians played an even stronger 
role in forming the cabinet. The HoR’s en-
dorsement of the GNU was a key condition 
for transcending the state of institutional 
division. To gain this endorsement, Dabeiba 
allowed small groups or even individual 
parliamentarians to name their own minis-
ters. During negotiations, many members 
of the HoR openly demanded what they 
claimed was a fair share in government 
posts for their cities, tribes or regions. 
Dabeiba fully submitted to such demands 
and thereby arrived at a government of 35 
ministers whose selection occurred on the 
basis of clientelist ties, and who have few 
common political interests. Several have 
already been subject to administrative rep-
rimands or judicial investigations for abuse 
of office, embezzlement and other charges. 
The GNU therefore does not rely on a 
coalition of well-identifiable political blocs. 
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Libya has few well-organized political 
forces, and they largely ended up empty 
handed in the process of government for-
mation – among them Haftar’s power 
structure in eastern Libya and the Justice 
and Construction Party, which is affiliated 
with the Muslim Brotherhood. Instead, 
the government includes representatives 
of dozens of different clientelist networks. 
To date, the UN-led process has only 
required these networks to agree that they 
will compete for access to state funds with-
in a single government. But exactly who 
gets what largely remains to be negotiated. 
Ministerial posts are only one aspect of this 
equation. Many other official positions can 
or must be reshuffled, and budgets are to 
be divided. Dabeiba still requires the HoR’s 
approval for the GNU budget, and in ex-
change for their confirmation thereof, par-
liamentarians are trying to push through 
their choices for deputy ministers. As soon 
as the budget has passed, competition over 
the control of funds will unfold within the 
government. In addition, members of both 
the HoR and GNU are trying to agree on 
new appointments to top positions, such as 
those of the Central Bank governor and the 
head of the Audit Bureau, for which they 
also intend to ensure proportional repre-
sentation of the regions. In sum, the new 
political settlement has yet to produce 
winners and losers. As a result, the GNU’s 
opponents will organize with time. Already, 
resentment is on the rise among the many 
political and military actors to whom 
Dabeiba had promised posts, so far without 
keeping his promises. 
The logic of proportional representation 
on the basis of regional or local origin had 
implicitly shaped previous governments 
as well. But the current process has openly 
established it as its dominant principle. 
The composition of the Presidency Council 
reflects this logic, as it will consist of one 
representative each for western, eastern 
and southern Libya. The blatant demands 
for a proportional share of government po-
sitions are transparent attempts to receive 
access to state funds. They rely on a tacit 
understanding between political actors that 
these funds serve to build patronage net-
works, or simply personal enrichment. 
This logic dominated the GNU’s formation 
mainly because the UN-led process depended 
on the lure of state wealth as the primary 
driver behind the LPDF. 
Persistent Military Realities 
To enable negotiations on the redistribution 
of access to state funds, political actors cir-
cumvented core issues and key players in 
the conflict. These include the continued 
existence of opposing military forces and 
the grievances – particularly impunity for 
war crimes – of groups from which the 
conflicting parties recruit. 
The armed groups on both sides of the 
most recent war were only marginally in-
volved in the political process. Haftar sub-
mitted to the process because his foreign 
backing dwindled in the wake of his defeat 
in Tripoli, and because he was exposed to 
Egyptian pressure. Likewise, his opponents 
in western Libya were also more or less 
excluded from the formation of the govern-
ment, because they lacked the necessary 
weight after fragmenting into rival factions 
subsequent to the war. But neither side 
has a strong stake in the GNU, nor do they 
effectively submit to its authority. 
So far, the GNU has refrained from 
claiming leadership in the security sector. 
According to the LPDF, the Presidency 
Council has the power to appoint the top 
echelons of the military and thereby to 
reunify command structures. But it has yet 
to do so. In fact, it remains unclear whether 
Haftar even recognizes the Presidency 
Council’s role as the supreme commander 
of the armed forces. For his part, Dabeiba 
has not named a defence minister because 
no candidate gained the acceptance of both 
Haftar and his adversaries. Dabeiba’s inte-
rior minister, like most of his predecessors, 
stands for a policy of allowing rival armed 
groups to operate under the interior minis-
try umbrella and benefit from its funds. 
Dabeiba himself has extensive contacts 
among armed groups in Tripoli, Misrata 
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and Zawiya, which have so far enjoyed 
greater leeway during his tenure than 
under the previous interior minister, Fathi 
Bashagha. 
As for the task of placing the competing 
military command structures under a uni-
fied leadership, the GNU has merely de-
ferred to the Joint Military Commission. 
Consisting of two sets of five officers 
appointed respectively by Haftar and the 
GNU’s predecessor government in Tripoli, 
the Joint Military Commission has confined 
itself to working out the details of the cease-
fire and its monitoring mechanism. It lacks 
the political weight to negotiate a reunifica-
tion of the army. The five officers appointed 
by Tripoli enjoy little trust among the armed 
groups that form the bulk of western Libyan 
forces. The role of the five officers appointed 
by Haftar is primarily to simulate the ex-
istence of a formal military hierarchy, 
whereby actual decision-making authority 
lies with the warlord’s inner circle of close 
relatives. 
Haftar’s effective submission to a unified 
military command is as equally unlikely as 
the possibility that his adversaries accept 
a leading role for him or his sons. The core 
LAAF units are inextricably intertwined 
with both his claim to overall power and 
the economic predation of his relatives. As 
long as Haftar’s power structure stands, he 
will only permit a notional integration into 
a national military, in order to gain access 
to funds. He urgently needs such access 
given his increasing financial difficulties, 
his tarnished standing following the Tripoli 
defeat and his limited influence on the 
government formation. But with the per-
sistence of Haftar’s forces, the threat he 
poses to his enemies in western Libya also 
endures and thereby necessitates their 
dependence on local militias and Turkish 
protection as security guarantees. 
In sum, the GNU is unlikely to make 
progress towards unifying command struc-
tures, tightening control over armed groups 
or dissolving militias. Armed actors are in-
sufficiently integrated into the political pro-
cess. The government itself avoids tackling 
the challenges in the security sector since 
doing so would collide with its approach 
of appeasing factions across political divides 
by offering them access to state funds. Fi-
nally, Haftar’s power structure remains the 
single biggest obstacle to the establishment 
of national security institutions. 
Even if the GNU continues to ignore the 
thorny issues in the security sector, it will 
soon see itself confronted with the realities 
of the military landscape. In Tripoli, armed 
groups exert great influence within state 
institutions – a state of affairs that has 
fuelled anger among forces in other cities 
and regions, and provoked open conflict in 
the capital in 2018. As in previous govern-
ments, the Tripoli militias are pushing to 
place allies in senior positions, which is 
already driving growing tensions in the 
capital. In the east and centre of the coun-
try, the GNU will only be able to operate 
with Haftar’s approval. Government repre-
sentatives will have to strike arrangements 
with Haftar’s forces; for the latter, this 
means opportunities to siphon off funds 
and fill positions with allies. Above all, 
recurrent acts of violence by armed groups 
will soon show just how limited the new 
government’s sway is over militias that 
nominally act as state security forces. 
Economic Opportunities? 
Instead of tackling the problems in the 
security sector, Dabeiba emphasizes that 
he intends to jump-start the economy and 
restore basic public services like the supply 
of power, cash and fuel. In doing so, he 
responds to pressing concerns among the 
population. The economy and financial 
sector have severely suffered during years 
of institutional division. Underinvestment, 
corruption and war damage have taken a 
toll on public infrastructure. Inflation and 
the decline of public services have impov-
erished large swathes of the middle class. 
But Dabeiba’s focus on the economy is 
also a political calculation. It fits well into 
the political class’s current tendency of 
ignoring fractious substantive issues in 
favour of focusing on splitting the spoils. 
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Dabeiba also hopes to gain political capital 
from an economic upturn, whether appar-
ent or real – political capital that could 
allow him to hold on to power longer than 
anticipated. This likely explains his early 
moves to increase public salaries by 20 per-
cent and pay a basic pension as well as 
child and spouse allowances. 
Dabeiba’s intention to resume major 
public investment projects for the first time 
since the 2014 political divide also likely 
hides ulterior motives. By awarding con-
tracts, Dabeiba could seek to gain the good-
will of foreign governments with the aim of 
securing his power. There are also justified 
fears that cronies associated with Dabeiba 
would use investment projects to siphon 
off profits through commissions or other 
methods. After all, Dabeiba represents a 
network that is notorious for doing just 
that. 
During the final years of the Qadhafi 
era, Dabeiba headed the state-owned Libyan 
Investment and Development Holding Com-
pany (LIDCO). This company partnered with 
foreign contractors to implement construc-
tion projects worth billions of dollars that 
were awarded by the Organisation for the 
Development of Administrative Centers 
(ODAC). Until 2011, the head of this state 
institution was Ali Dabeiba, a cousin and 
brother-in-law of the current prime minis-
ter as well as a current member of the LPDF. 
While at the helm of ODAC, Ali Dabeiba 
amassed immense wealth that can only be 
explained by massive corruption, leading 
to suspicions that have caused Libyan and 
British authorities to open fraud investiga-
tions. Abdelhamid Dabeiba’s ostentatious 
prosperity is also difficult to reconcile with 
his job as an executive at a state-owned 
company. Moreover, in recent years, the 
prime minister paid millions to lobbying 
firms in the US and France to raise his 
political profile, partly using LIDCO funds 
for this purpose. It seems likely that 
Dabeiba’s political ambitions are also a 
quest to amass even greater wealth. 
With Dabeiba, an entire network of 
interests has come to power. Well-informed 
observers in Dabeiba’s native Misrata con-
cur that his cousin Ali is the eminence grise 
behind the prime minister. Since 2011, 
Ali Dabeiba has built a patronage network 
among armed groups in Misrata and Tripoli 
to protect his interests. His son Ibrahim is 
the prime minister’s closest adviser, even 
accompanying him to meetings with for-
eign heads of state. Other advisers are also 
longstanding confidants, some of whom he 
worked with at LIDCO and to whom he is 
related by marriage. In addition, the minis-
ters for transport and construction, as well 
as the state minister for prime minister 
affairs also have close ties to the Dabeiba 
network. Using his official powers, Dabeiba 
will seek to place allies in top positions at 
state-owned enterprises. 
The Dabeiba network’s interests are there-
fore ambivalent. On the one hand, visible 
economic and social amelioration would 
serve to secure Dabeiba’s hold on power. 
On the other hand, cronyism and corrup-
tion obstruct such progress – even more 
so as the proponents of rival networks in 
the government will also strive for self-
enrichment. 
Competing interest groups within the 
GNU are only one obstacle to reforms. 
Corruption is rampant across all levels of 
the public sector. Curbing it would require 
restoring the authority of the courts and 
at least an embryonic state monopoly on 
violence. In addition, key institutions such 
as the Audit Bureau and the Central Bank 
remain divided, and the prime minister has 
no remit over them. Rival networks could 
use such institutions as levers to veto con-
tracts and other budget allocations. 
Dabeiba has found a powerful ally in 
Central Bank Governor al-Siddiq al-Kabir, 
who is keen to maintain good relations 
with the government to secure his position, 
and also has longstanding ties to the 
Dabeiba network. Over the past year, Kabir 
came under strong pressure from Dabeiba’s 
predecessor Faiez al-Serraj as well as the 
chairman of the National Oil Corporation 
Mustafa Sanalla, both of whom sought to 
oust him. But with the advent of the GNU, 
that pressure has faded, which hasn’t 
helped to advance reforms. Kabir is now 
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less cooperative on efforts to reunify the Cen-
tral Bank, as doing so would dilute his power 
over the institution. A key unresolved issue 
concerns the 70 billion dinars (13 billion 
euros) in public debt accumulated by the 
parallel eastern authorities since 2015. Only 
reunification of the Central Bank would 
permit a concerted effort to restore trust 
in the dinar, improve the availability of 
cash and tackle the discrepancy between 
the official and parallel exchange rate. 
The Foreign Military Presence 
The contrast between the semblance of 
compromise and the facts on the ground 
is starkest in the continuing presence of 
foreign forces and mercenaries that back 
the parties to the most recent civil war. 
According to the ceasefire agreement of 
23 October 2020, all foreign forces were 
to leave Libya within three months. Six 
months after the ceasefire agreement was 
signed, no such withdrawal is in sight. In 
fact, Turkey and Russia are continuing to 
reinforce their presence. Turkish military 
flights to al-Wutiya Airbase continue, as 
does the building of fortifications in central 
Libya by mercenaries of the Wagner Group, 
whose activities the Russian government 
denies but actually controls. Another key 
actor is the UAE, which has financed and 
equipped at least parts of the contingents of 
Russian, Syrian and Sudanese mercenaries 
bolstering Haftar. 
Turkish and Russian footprints are solidi-
fying because both continue to serve as 
security guarantors for the conflicting par-
ties. These groups fear that their foreign 
backers’ departures would alter the balance 
of power, provoking renewed fighting. The 
Syrian mercenaries that Turkey has deployed 
in Libya are largely irrelevant to the balance 
of forces, but the formal Turkish military 
presence is crucial. Turkish officials con-
sistently argue that the ceasefire agreement 
does not affect their official presence, but 
more recently, they have started signalling 
that Turkey is ready to withdraw the Syrians 
if Haftar’s mercenaries leave the country too. 
But for Haftar, whose foreign backers 
do not acknowledge their role, the Russian 
mercenaries are vital. To a lesser extent, 
the same can be said for his Syrian and 
Sudanese fighters. In the absence of an 
alternative foreign security umbrella, a Rus-
sian withdrawal would threaten Haftar’s 
influence in southern and central Libya, 
and could even provoke the collapse of his 
power structure. As with other core issues 
in the conflict, there is therefore little 
chance for progress on the matter so long 
as Haftar remains an indispensable, albeit 
difficult, partner for his foreign sponsors. 
Neither the UAE nor Egypt will want the 
withdrawal of mercenaries to lead to Haf-
tar’s sudden demise and the eruption of 
conflicts in eastern Libya. 
Even beyond the mercenary dilemma, 
conflicting foreign interests will compound 
the centrifugal forces within the govern-
ment. States that were on opposing sides 
in the recent war are now trying to woo in-
dividual figures in the GNU. So far, Prime 
Minister Dabeiba has sought to maintain 
ambivalence in relations with these states. 
But as they push for the government to 
position itself more clearly, they could exac-
erbate tensions within the GNU – such as 
between Dabeiba and the Presidency Coun-
cil, both of whom claim the right to repre-
sent Libya internationally. 
The Coming Crisis 
On paper, the GNU’s role is to prepare the 
country for the parliamentary and presi-
dential elections planned for 24 December 
2021, to usher in Libya’s first unified and 
democratic government since 2014. In 
reality, the GNU’s formation has created 
a vested interest in the new status quo. 
Dabeiba’s grand plans for public invest-
ments and decentralization leave little 
doubt that he aims to stay on beyond 2021, 
just as the clientelist networks in his gov-
ernment will also seek to hold on to power 
for as long as possible. This is all the more 
the case as an LPDF decision prevents GNU 
members from running in the elections. 
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The conflict of interest is most glaring in 
the House of Representatives, whose mem-
bers have just placed their candidates in 
ministerial positions – and should now 
prepare these ministers’ exits by adopting a 
constitutional and legal framework for the 
elections. To block such votes, parliamen-
tarians interested in the survival of the 
Dabeiba government could exploit the con-
tinuing dispute over the HoR’s presidency 
and meeting venue, as well as over the pos-
sibility of holding a constitutional referen-
dum. 
A plausible scenario therefore is that 
progress towards the elections could remain 
elusive, meaning that the Dabeiba govern-
ment could hold on to power beyond 24 
December 2021. This situation would be 
bound to trigger a new political crisis even 
if the government blames the HoR for the 
delay. Many actors have only accepted the 
new government due to its limited man-
date. Extending it would call the GNU’s 
legitimacy into question. The ranks of the 
government’s opponents, which are set 
to grow with the upcoming distributive 
struggles, could then swell dramatically. 
Renewed political division would be a real 
possibility. 
In view of the significant obstacles to 
elections, domestic and foreign pressure 
currently focuses on making sure that the 
elections take place – but not on creating 
the conditions for free and fair elections. 
For the UN as for Libyan political forces, 
the elections have become an end in them-
selves. There is little discussion whether 
they will help to resolve conflict. Nonethe-
less, the minimum conditions for successful 
elections are lacking. By reunifying military 
command structures, the GNU was sup-
posed to mitigate the risk that armed groups 
could manipulate electoral results or refuse 
to recognize them. But by now, it has 
become clear that little progress is likely 
to be made in the security sector. 
If the elections happen, they are bound 
to be accompanied by violence and irregu-
larities in several cities and regions. The 
situation is most problematic in areas con-
trolled by Haftar, where dissidents face 
fierce persecution. Presidential elections 
harbour particular potential for conflict, 
since the victory of any candidate affiliated 
with a party to the conflict would pose an 
existential threat to that party’s adversaries. 
But even in the absence of large-scale esca-
lation, the risk that political forces could 
challenge, reject and even fight the results 
would be high. 
Conclusions 
The stated aim of the UN-led process is to 
tackle a root cause of the conflict by en-
suring fairer and more transparent manage-
ment of state wealth. In reality, however, 
the GNU’s formation has prepared the 
grounds for intensified looting of the state. 
This, in essence, is what competing net-
works have agreed to under the cover of 
regional and local proportionalism, and to 
that effect, they have circumvented most 
substantive issues in the conflict. The ap-
pointment of a prime minister whose name 
is synonymous with Qadhafi-era corruption 
epitomizes this understanding. As a basis 
for a reunified Libya, this settlement could 
have wide-ranging consequences and shape 
the political system even after the next 
elections. More immediately concerning is 
the fact that this settlement creates the con-
ditions for renewed conflict, even if the 
imbalances and losers it produces will take 
time to surface. 
Current European attitudes towards the 
GNU will not encourage it to temper these 
tendencies. Europeans are relieved that 
they can present the GNU’s formation as 
a success of their diplomacy. They also 
display a keen interest in the deals Dabeiba 
dangles in front of them. Official European 
policy in support of the elections notwith-
standing, some diplomats exhibit a growing 
preference for the stability they hope 
Dabeiba could bring. This is problematic, 
since Dabeiba’s continuation beyond De-
cember 2021 would be very likely to pro-
voke a new political crisis. It is important 
to encourage progress towards elections, 
even if they will bring serious risks under 
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the current conditions. But the elections 
should not be seen as a mere box-ticking 
exercise. Europeans should not only focus 
on ensuring the passage of a legal frame-
work for the elections. Their attention 
should shift to the conditions in which the 
elections will take place, and the actors 
that could prevent the subsequent peaceful 
transfer of power. 
 
Dr. Wolfram Lacher is a Senior Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division at SWP. 
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